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Abstract
Of the many challenges facing risk analysis practitioners, perhaps the most difficult to
overcome is in the field of terrorist threat analysis. When estimating the threat associated
with naturally occurring events, historical data provides a great deal of insight into the
frequency of those events. Threat associated with accidents applies many operations
research tools to gauge future failure-rates (Failure Mode and Effects Analysis being
perhaps the most widely known). However, estimating the probability of an individual's or
group's attacking a specific (or even a generic) target is an element of risk analysis in
which art and intuition are applied far more regularly than is science.
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Abstract
Of the many challenges facing risk analysis practitioners, perhaps the
most difficult to overcome is in the field of terrorist threat analysis. When
estimating the threat associated with naturally occurring events, historical data provides a great deal of insight into the frequency of those events.
Threat associated with accidents applies many operations research tools
to gauge future failure-rates (Failure Mode and Effects Analysis being
perhaps the most widely known). However, estimating the probability of
an individual's or group's attacking a specific (or even a generic) target is
an element of risk analysis in which art and intuition are applied far more
regularly than is science.

Introduction
To the extent one can use the term, the "traditional" method to estimate
terrorist threat is to decompose threat into two components,1 "intent" and
"capability," estimate the two variables independently, and then combine
them (usually, but far from always, multiplicatively) to generate a nondimensional threat score.2 This threat score may take the form of an ordinal ranking (some variant on high, medium, or low), or it may take on a
cardinal value (where, for example, a value of six represents a threat
which is twice as likely to occur as a threat represented by a three). Which
form the score takes depends on the nature of the problem which the analyst is to address.
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While the specific terminology varies from tool to tool, "capability" ranges
on a scale which begins with a variant on the theme "the group does not
possess the resources, training, or experience" to execute the attack.
"Capability" ratings steadily increase until they end with "the group has
executed a very similar attack before."
"Intent" ratings follow a similar course. They begin with a variant of the
theme that the group in question posses "no known desire" to execute
such an attack and end with the assessment that the group has developed
and is implementing "a feasible plan" to conduct that attack.
For both "intent" and "capability" ratings, analysts reference a scoring
matrix which provides several descriptions and corresponding scores.
They match their understanding of the threat to the closest "intent" and
"capability" description the matrix offers. They then pull out the scores
linked to the descriptions which they previously choose. Finally, they
combine those scores in a predetermined function to generate a single
threat number.3 That combination mechanism is either a look-up table or
a simple function (additive or multiplicative) and does not require analytical interpretation to produce.

Issues with Current Approaches
There are five major issues associated with this "intent" and "capability"
framework, and these issues are both interrelated in nature and compounding in effect. They all, directly or indirectly, impact the inherent
uncertainty of threat estimates, uncertainty which arises from both a paucity of specific data regarding "intent" and the environmental reality that
"intent" can change rapidly.

Implied Precision
When applying ordinal scales, precision is not an issue because the difference between a "low" rating and a "very low" rating is not a relevant concern. Unfortunately, quantitative assessments—the types which provide
analysts the ability to combine factors—require a great degree of differentiability in scores, and that requirement demands cardinal scales. Additionally, the use of these scales creates a perception that the threat
assessment is both defensible and reproducible, characteristics which are
at odds with the subjective and uncertain data which serve as input.
In cases where analysts examine scenarios which are relatively similar
(e.g., Vehicle-Borne Improvised Explosive Device (VBIED) attacks on air58
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ports versus IED attacks on aircraft), this differentiability requirement is
not a significant burden. The challenge comes to the fore when comparing
the threats associated with very different scenarios. When the nature of
either the attack method or the target changes significantly from scenario
to scenario (e.g., VBIED attacks on bridges versus biological attacks on
bus stations), "intent" and "capability" scores may vary by several orders
of magnitude—and it is then that the difference between a "low" and a
"very low" score matters greatly.

Relative Nature of Estimates
The second issue, related to the first, is that terrorist threat assessments
produce relative likelihood estimates, not absolute ones. When comparing similar scenarios, this is not materially important; analysts can generate reliable estimates using techniques such as benchmarking and
reasoning-by-analogy. However, this characteristic becomes more and
more important as scenarios become increasingly dissimilar.
Analysts can make judgments regarding the relative likelihood of two
similar scenarios—they simply point to areas of divergence and make reasoned comparisons between the two. However, when there are very few
points of similarity, it is no longer possible to make that comparison, and
the technique—along with the analysis it supports—loses its value.

Human Factors
What makes the situation so frustrating is that it is exceptionally challenging to develop cardinal scales of "intent" and "capability," especially—
but not exclusively—at the very low end of the scale. Because quantitative
formulas combine several variables multiplicatively, the impact of a
change of X basis points increases as the score decreases (ΔX/4, for example, is twenty times greater than ΔX/80). Compounding that challenge is
the behavioral reality that people do not have the capacity to make material distinctions between frequency estimates when the difference
between one estimate and another is small (e.g., a 4% probability and a
5% probability are both "low" even though one is 25 percent greater than
the other). In that light, it is potentially problematic to believe quantitative analyses in cases where analysts have to decide whether a low probability event—an event which has never happened—has a 1 in 100, 1 in
1,000, or 1 in 10,000 chance of occurring.
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Correlated Variables
The fourth issue is that it is difficult to develop an approach which combines "intent" and "capability" scores in a consistent, defensible fashion.
Federal analysts have been using variants of the "intent" and "capability"
framework for decades, and it was a particularly useful model when
decomposing threat on a large-scale, multi-year, nation-state level (e.g.,
the Soviet Union's development of a manned bomber program). However,
for terrorism threat assessment purposes, applying that same framework
can present its own issues.
Because "intent" and "capability" are not independent variables (an organization which does not possess chemical weapons is not going to develop
tactical plans to use them), a formula for combining the two variables has
to be non-linear (the threat associated with an "intent" score of 0.5 and a
"capability" score of 0.5 cannot automatically be equivalent to a threat
with an "intent" score of 0.25 and a "capability" score of 1.0). While it is
clear that there is a correlation between the two variables, the nature of
the relationship between the two variables is not well understood. Indeed,
it may change on a scenario-by-scenario basis.

Inter-Judge Consistency
The final issue is that multiple analysts, all sorting through complex,
incomplete data, and converting that information into a single score, do
not consistently agree about what that score should be. Part of the challenge is that neither "intent" nor "capability" data is sufficiently clear-cut
as to allow for a mechanistic conversion from textual information to a
point score. Part of that challenge is that analysts have individual biases
upon which they rely to weigh the value of the information they use to
make their judgments. And part of that challenge is analysts do not always
feel compelled to follow the ranking guidance they receive.
These challenges combine to reduce the degree to which scores are
repeatable across analysts. While there are techniques to improve crossanalyst consistency (such as beginning the process by ranking a representative set of scenarios as a group), these techniques only reduce the consistency problem; they do not eliminate it.
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A Different Approach
To partially compensate for these issues, analysts may consider using a
threat-scoring system based on the resources necessary to carry out the
attack. Such a system assumes that organizations do not pursue acquiring
the capability to conduct attacks which they have no intent of executing.
To apply this system, the analyst first determines the level of resources
terrorists need. There are six options from which to choose, ranging from
those of a nation-state to those of a single, law-abiding resident.
Once the analyst decides which table to apply, he or she determines which
description of activity/reporting is most similar to the threat being examined. The analyst then uses the three scores corresponding to that
description either as the points of a triangular distribution (for a Monte
Carlo simulation) or as the limits of a range in which they independently
choose a point estimate of threat—using the value in bold font as a
default.4

Example Using Proposed Approach
Consider the case where an analyst is examining the likelihood of alQaida using a nuclear weapon against the United States. The analyst
would first decide, based on the North Korean experience, that executing
such an attack would require both a decade and resources of a nationstate. That decision would drive the analyst to use Table II. After reviewing current intelligence, the analyst would decide that, within Table II, the
word picture which comes closest to describing the current intelligence is,
"There are no indications of any nation-state transferring technical
knowledge, material, or devices to the enemy." Accordingly, the analyst
would use the points .00–.001–.003 as the low, medium, and high points
for a Monte Carlo simulation.

Example Using Current Approach
Consider the same case, but change the analytic framework to the "intent"
times "capability" approach, where both "intent" and "capability" are
measured on ten-point scales. That same analyst would agree with President Obama's statement on April 12, 2010, when he said, "We know that
organizations like al-Qaida are in the process of trying to secure nuclear
weapons or other weapons of mass destruction, and would have no compunction at using them." Accordingly, the analyst would assign an
"intent" score no lower than a "1"—meaning that al-Qaida's level of intent
is as least aspirational. The analyst's next step would be to examine "capa61
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bility." For that category, the analyst would again review current intelligence and would decide that al-Qaida does not have, but is trying to
acquire, components for a nuclear device. Accordingly, the analyst would
assign a "capability" score no lower than a "1."
Multiplying the two terms generates a threat score of 1 (out of 100)—
implying that the likelihood of al-Qaida using a nuclear weapon against
the United States is at least 1% as great as that of al-Qaida attempting an
attack via any other vector (such as Improvised Explosive Device [IED]).
It is clear that this conclusion materially overstates the likelihood of alQaida attempting to attack the United States with a nuclear weapon,
given:
• existing safeguards on fissile material;
• al-Qaida's limited resource base;
• their familiarity with other attack vectors; and
• the relative ease with which they could execute an IED attack.

Limitations
The scales used are relative. While these tables provide analysts with a
tool which allows them to compare across materially different threat scenarios, the scores are not directly comparable with the frequency estimates associated with natural hazards. For example, it is reasonable to
assign Umar Abdulmutallab's attempt to bomb Northwest Flight 253 to
the ".60–.75–1.0" range in Table V, where "Delivery to the target site
requires specialized knowledge or equipment and there are credible indications that the enemy possesses that knowledge or equipment." However, that range (0.60–1.0) is far too high to be an annual probability
since the previous attempt, Richard Reid's plot to bomb American Airlines Flight 63 occurred eight years prior. The time lag between those two
events indicates that the suggested probabilities may be six to ten times
too high to be absolute values.
The validity of low-end scores remains questionable. While the range of
the scale used (0.001–1.0) provides for finer low-end gradation than does
a 1 to 10 scale, there is little to suggest that the scores for very low probability threats (e.g., improvised nuclear devices) are within even an orderof-magnitude of reality.
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This approach assumes that analysts will be aware of terrorists' efforts to
develop innovative ways to combine existing skills and knowledge to create new attack vectors. Terrorists have repeatedly demonstrated their
ability to innovate; and there is every reason to assume that they will continue to do so. They will creatively combine resources to circumvent existing security measures, and, when they do, it is quite likely that their
adaptability will surprise analysts and security professionals alike.
Finally, this approach does not account for serendipity. While terrorists
take a deliberate approach to planning attacks, random chance plays a
part in target selection as well (e.g., a terrorist cell with a member who is a
bridge engineer is more likely to attack a bridge than is a cell without
one). Similarly, random chance is likely to play a role in capability development. If a terrorist cell happens to recruit both a chemical engineer and
an HVAC repairman, that cell is far more likely to attempt to develop a
chemical weapon than would otherwise be the case.

Conclusion
Terrorism risk analysis is a field in its infancy, and it faces many challenges, not least among them being the development of useful and accurate quantitative threat assessment methodologies. Practitioners have
identified a need for a substitute for the "intent" and "capability" model of
threat analysis, and this monograph serves to shine a light on one possible
alternative.
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Table I: Ranking Estimated Capability
Score

A

B

C

D

E

F

Resour
ces
needed
to execute
attack

Requires
a decade
and
resources
of a
nationstate to
execute

Requires
years of
multiple
people
with
graduate
degrees
in technical sciences,
and
resources
of Fortune
1,000like company to
execute

Requires
multiple
people
with
graduate
degrees
in technical sciences,
and luck,
to execute

Requires
specialized
knowledge of
technical
or engineering
processes to
execute

Requires
the
acquisition of
illegal/
controlled
products
to execute

Requires
legally
purchased
products
and
readily
available
manufacturing
instructions to
execute
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Table II: Nation-State
Score

.00 – .001 – .01 - .05 –
.003
.20

Requires a
decade and
the
resources
of a nationstate to execute

There are no
indications of
any nationstate transferring technical
knowledge,
material, or
devices to the
enemy

There is
unconfirmed
reporting
that a nationstate has
transferred
knowledge to
the enemy or
there are
indications
that the
enemy can
acquire
device due to
inadequate
security at a
storage site

.05 – .20 –
.30

.40 – .60 –
.85

There is
unconfirmed
reporting
that a nationstate has
transferred
material to
the enemy

There is confirmed
reporting
that a nationstate has
transferred
material to
the enemy or
there are
indications
that a nationstate has lost
control of a
man-portable device

Table III: Fortune 1,000 Company
Score

.001 – .005 –
.01

.05 – .15 – .50

.35 – .40 – .85

Requires years
of multiple
people with
graduate
degrees in
technical sciences, and the
resources of
Fortune 1,000like company
to execute

There are no
indications of
any organization
transferring
technical knowledge, material, or
devices to the
enemy

There is unconfirmed reporting
that a company
has transferred
manufacturing
knowledge to the
enemy or there
are indications
that the enemy
can acquire
material due to
inadequate security at a storage
site

There is confirmed reporting
that a company
has transferred
manufacturing
knowledge to the
enemy
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Table IV: Multiple Technically-Trained People
Score

.001 – .01 –
.02

.01 – .05 –
.10

.30 – .50 –
.80

.70 – .80 –
1.0

Requires
years of
multiple
people with
graduate
degrees in
technical
sciences,
and luck, to
execute

There are no
indications
that the
enemy has
begun a
research program

There are
multiple
reports that
the enemy
has begun a
research program

There are
multiple
reports that
the enemy
has begun
testing a
delivery
device

There are
multiple
reports that
the enemy
has completed an
effective distribution system

Table V: Specialized Knowledge
Score

.05 – .20 – .30

.40 – .50 – .80

.60 – .75 – 1.0

Requires specialized
knowledge of
technical or
engineering
processes to
execute

Delivery to the
target site
requires specialized knowledge
or equipment
and there are no
credible indications that the
enemy possesses
that knowledge
or equipment

Delivery to the
target site
requires specialized knowledge
or equipment
and purchasing
or renting that
knowledge or
equipment is a
commercially
viable option

Delivery to the
target site
requires specialized knowledge
or equipment
and there are
credible indications that the
enemy possesses
that knowledge
or equipment
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Table VI: Illegal Products
Score

.10 – .15 – .20 – .40
.40
– .50

Requires
the
acquisition of
illegal/
controlled
products
to execute

The enemy
would have
to steal a
product to
acquire it
in the U.S.
and there
are no
indications this
has happened

The enemy
would have
to steal a
product to
acquire it
in U.S.
and there
are indications this
has happened

.20 – .40
– .60

.50 – .60
– .70

.50 – .60
– 1.0

The enemy
could purchase the
product in
the U.S.
and there
are no
indications this
has happened

The enemy
could purchase the
product in
the U.S.
and there
are indications this
has happened

There are
indications that
the enemy
has
acquired
the product outside of the
U.S.

Table VII: Legal Products
Score

.70 – .80 – .90

.80 – 1.0

Requires legally
purchased products and readily
available manufacturing instructions
to execute

The target is easily
accessible and the purchase of a quantity of
equipment necessary to
develop a device may
raise suspicion

The target is easily
accessible and the purchase of a quantity of
equipment necessary to
develop a device would
not raise suspicion

References
1 Threat is the likelihood of an attack being attempted by an adversary or the likelihood that a hazard will manifest itself within a given time-frame.
2 In this model, capability is the ability of an adversary to attack with a particular
attack method, while intent is the desire or design to conduct a type of attack or to
attack a type of target.
3 These scores are either cardinal or ordinal in nature.
4 The look-up tables are at the end of this monologue.
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